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1. Background and Introduction 
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) and organizing it primarily at the river 
basin level are two of the most common and widely repeated recommendations in the 
water resources literature of the last decade if not longer (Allee 1988; Galloway 1997; 
McDonald and Kay 1988; World Bank 1993).  Basin management is often associated 
with the concept of decentralization, of managing water resources at the “lowest 
appropriate level.” (See, e.g., International Conference on Water and the Environment 
1992; Mody 2001).  Several conceptual arguments have been presented in favor of 
decentralization in water resource management, and basin-level management in 
particular, including that the whole array of resources and use patterns in the basin will be 
taken into account, management decisions will be based on better knowledge of local 
conditions, and incentives for stakeholders to actively participate in management will be 
stronger. 
  Empirical studies of river basin management systems provide opportunities to 
examine the claims made for basin-level integrated resources management, and to 
explore factors that appear to influence its implementation and outcomes.  In this research 
project the project team has searched for those factors and their relationships to river 
basin management in two ways: with a survey of river basin organizations throughout the 
world, and with case studies of eight river basins analyzed in greater detail.  Some of 
those eight cases have long histories of basin-scale institutions for water resource 
management, such as the Guadalquivir river basin in Spain and the Murray-Darling river 
basin in Australia.  Others have emerged recently, as in the Fraser basin in British 
Columbia, Canada where the Fraser Basin Management Board was established in the 
early 1990s, succeeded in 1997 by the Fraser Basin Council. 
This case has been an extremely valuable addition to the research project, for 
three main reasons.  First, it adds an example of a nongovernmental river basin 
organization, whereas the other cases were of governmental or inter-governmental 
structures.  The Fraser Basin case is not one of governmental decentralization, but of the 
creation of a non-governmental body facilitating the coordination of a number of 
decentralized private-sector and public-sector activities within the river basin.  Second, 
the Fraser Basin Council has pursued a very broad scope of topics that its members see as 
related to an overall concept of basin “sustainability,” which includes social and 
economic as well as environmental aspects.  Third, the formation of the basin council 
(and its predecessor basin management board) was a locally initiated action that occurred 
in the fairly recent memory of many individuals who are still actively involved, and 
whose perspectives on the origin and evolution of the basin management effort are both 
fresh and rich. 
This paper focuses on analysis of the establishment of a non-governmental, multi-
stakeholder, and consensus-based approach to river basin governance and management in 
the Fraser River basin.  Only brief descriptions of the basin’s physical characteristics, 
social and economic profile, and historical development are included in this paper; more 
detailed information about those important matters may be found in Calbick et al. (2004). 
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2. Analytical Framework 
To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of 
river basin organizations, the project team has developed a framework that identifies a 
number of political and institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, 
sustainability, and success or failure of decentralized approaches to integrated water 
resource management at the basin scale.  These factors, and their hypothesized 
relationships with basin management in a country that has decentralized or is attempting 
to decentralize water resource management institutions, are derived from the institutional 
analysis literature relating to water or other natural resource management and to 
decentralized systems (especially Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; 
Blomquist and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991). 
Our information gathering and analysis focuses on the following sets of variables. 
 
  Contextual factors and initial conditions 
  Characteristics of the decentralization process 
  Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
  The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
  Motivation of stakeholders 
Variables considered within each set are listed the Appendix.  The Fraser Basin case is 
discussed in terms of these categories and variables in Section 8. 
 
3. Methodology 
A case study approach was pursued for this project in order to examine closely the 
processes of institutional change as well as the current situation.  A site visit was 
facilitated by Fraser Basin Council staff who arranged a schedule of interviews with 
basin stakeholders and observers, and by a local consultant engaged by the Fraser Basin 
Council who prepared a background paper on the basin prior to the visit.  Background 
papers for all case study visits are based on a common outline.  During the site visit, team 
members met with and interviewed 28 individuals, including basin-level stakeholders, 
past and current central, provincial and local government officials, basin council staff and 
members, and academic researchers with perspectives on governmental structure and 
water management in Canada.
2  The interviews were focused on understanding the 
processes of institutional origin and change, and the performance of water management 
institutions at sub-basin, basin, and national scales, matters that were closely within the 
                                                 
2 These included individuals from the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, 
the British Columbia Ministry of Sustainable Resources Management, the British Columbia Ministry of 
Health, the British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, the Sto:lo First Nations tribal 
council, the Musqueam First Nations tribal council, B.C. Hydro, the Fraser River Port Authority, the 
Greater Vancouver Regional District, the Fraser River Estuary Management Program, the Burrard Inlet 
Estuary Action Program, the District of Kent, the Bulkley-Nechako Regional District, Gibraltar Mines Ltd., 
University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, Central Naturalists Council, Fraser Basin Council 
staff, and several individual proprietors doing business in the basin. 
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knowledge of the interviewees.  After the visit, team members combined their notes from 
the interviews, revisited and revised the basin background paper, reviewed other 
materials, and composed this paper summarizing and analyzing the river basin 
management situation in the Fraser basin.
3 
    The following analysis of the Fraser basin case is therefore based on a 
combination of sources—documentary materials on the basin and the various 
governmental and non-governmental organizations at work there, the background paper 
prepared for the visit, and the interviews conducted during the site visit.  The findings 
and conclusions therefore do not represent the point of view of a single individual or 
organization, but emerge from a composite of data collected and reviewed by the research 
project team. 
 
4. The Fraser River Basin
4 
The Fraser River drains 238,000 km
2 of British Columbia, an area about the size of the 
United Kingdom.  The Fraser River basin supports a population of more than 2.7 million 
residents, and an economy that includes forestry and pulp and paper production, ranching 
and agriculture, fishing, mining, recreation and tourism and other industries.  Seventy-
eight percent of the basin’s population lives in the lower Fraser River valley and estuary 
region where the Vancouver metropolitan area is located. 
The basin has been home to aboriginal peoples, or First Nations, for thousands of 
years.  The current population of indigenous residents is estimated to be 50,000.  The 
number of distinct First Nations is subject to varying estimates, but Fraser Basin Council 
estimates place it around 100, which may be categorized into eight major language 
groups. 
The river itself (named for explorer/settler Simon Fraser) is 1,399 km long, 
originating in the Rocky Mountains and emptying into the Strait of Georgia and the 
Pacific Ocean after flowing through the Vancouver metropolitan area.  There are 13 
principal watersheds or sub-basins of the Fraser basin, identified in Figure 1, but on a 
broader scale one could identify three main hydrologic regions—the coastal mountains, 
the interior plateau, and the eastern (Columbia and Rocky) mountains.  The interior 
plateau is the driest of these regions, the coastal mountains the wettest. 
Weather systems moving onshore from the Pacific deposit large volumes of 
precipitation during autumn and winter in the mountain ranges, increasing with elevation 
and occurring predominantly as snow that thaws through the spring and summer months.  
While snow also is the principal winter precipitation in the interior plateau, peak 
precipitation in this region occurs as spring and summer rainfall.  In some areas of the 
basin, glacial melt is also an important source of surface stream flow. 
 
                                                 
3 Comments on an earlier draft were received from Allen Domaas, Daryl Fields, and Hans Schreier and are 
appreciated. 




Figure 1. The Fraser River Sub-Basins. 
Source: Fraser Basin Council, www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/fraser_basin/watersheds.html 
 
    Between snowmelt from the mountains and rainfall in the interior, spring and 
summer are the time of greatest stream flow in the Fraser basin.  When spring or early 
summer rains coincide with peak periods of snow melt, flooding can be and has been a 
significant problem in the basin, especially in the lower Fraser sub-basin.  The flood of 
record in the basin occurred in 1894, and the 20
th century benchmark was a major flood 
in 1948.  Even in non-flood periods, the amount of precipitation and stream flow 
concentrated in the lower Fraser River valley has contributed to drainage problems there.  
Millions of dollars of dyke works have been constructed and maintained, with financial 
assistance from the federal and provincial governments, to keep streams in the lower river 
area within their banks and to preserve agricultural lands and building foundations from 
seepage. 
The interior portion of the basin is drier, and even subject to occasional drought.  
Non-aboriginal development of water use in the basin began with irrigation in the interior 
plateau in the mid-1800s.  Farming and ranching in the interior, along with extractive 
industries such as timber and mining, sometimes compete for relatively scarce surface 
water supplies, particularly toward the late summer and autumn. 
The river basin is also rich and diverse in natural resources.  Eleven of the 14 
biogeoclimatic zones of British Columbia occur in the basin, where an estimated 512   8
non-insect animal species live.  The Fraser River has been a great salmon-producing 
system.  More than half of Canadian catches of sockeye and pink salmon are from the 
Fraser River and its tributaries.  For the many First Nations in the basin, fishing is 
important as both an economic and a cultural pursuit.  Combining aboriginal and non-
aboriginal commercial and recreational activities, fishing yields an annual return in 
excess of $300 million (Marshall 1998). 
 
5. Basin Management Issues and Stakeholders 
In addition to the flood hazard mentioned in the preceding section, the principal resource 
management challenges in the Fraser River basin are the following. 
 
  Comparing the most recent decade with the historical record, the number of 
salmon returning to spawn have decreased in half of the basin streams assessed 
(FBC 2003) while increasing in others. 
  Although toxic discharges have declined due to municipal sewage treatment plant 
improvements and the adoption of new technologies at pulp and paper plants in 
the basin, concentrations of toxic materials (e.g., chlorinated organic compounds 
such as guiacols from pulp mills) have accumulated in estuarine fish far 
downstream from discharge points. 
  Eight of 15 streams designated by the British Columbia government as sensitive 
under the Fish Protection Act are in the Fraser basin. 
  Toxic materials have also accumulated in the sediments and biota of poorly 
flushed streams and in areas adjacent to outfalls. 
  Dyking and drainage in the lower basin area have reduced the extent of estuarine 
wetlands that are important to salmon and waterfowl populations. 
  Precipitation is contaminated by heavy metals (e.g. lead, mercury) as well as 
PAH’s and acidic gases, evidently from atmospheric emissions in the Greater 
Vancouver area. 
  In the lower Fraser valley, groundwater has been contaminated by manure, 
fertilizers and pesticides—particularly the Abbotsford/Sumas aquifer and the 
Brookswood aquifer. 
  Some lakes in the interior areas of the basin—particularly Williams, Loon, and 
Dragon lakes—are showing nutrient impacts from animal wastes. 
  High water demands in drier portions of the interior have resulted in local water 
shortages. 
  Approximately one of every ten vertebrate species in the basin is “red listed,” 
meaning it is extirpated, threatened or endangered. 
  Aging flood control infrastructure (especially dykes in the Fraser Valley) and 
exposure of the lower river basin to soil liquefaction in an earthquake, stimulating 
huge risks of additional losses from collapse of dykes. 
  Nine aquifers in the Fraser basin are classified by the B.C. government as heavily 
used.  Seventeen aquifers in the basin (11 in the Lower Fraser sub-basin and the 
other six in interior sub-basins) are classified as having substantial water quality 
or quantity problems.  Intensive agriculture in the Fraser Valley has contributed 
more recently to concerns about groundwater contamination from fertilizer and 
pesticide applications.   9
  In the Fraser River estuary, conflicts over water use and wastewater disposal are 
most numerous and intense of those anywhere in the basin.  The interests of 
commercial, recreational, and First Nations fishers collide with one another, as 
well as with river transportation and municipal and industrial waste discharges.  
Riverside access for shipping conflicts with desires of contemporary urban 
dwellers, governments, and developers for waterfront homes and restaurants, river 
walks, and green space.  Effluent from three primary wastewater treatment plants 
in the region pollutes the water relied upon by fish for habitat, fishers for 
livelihood, and residents or tourists for recreation. 
  Although fewer people live in the interior portions of the basin, their per capita 
water use is more than twice that of the lower valley.  Also, the pulp mills found 
in the interior and upper basin use more water than any other industry in the basin.  
Thus, even in these portions of the basin where development is less extensive, 
water use can reach the capacity of water supplies in dry periods. 
  On accessible lakes and streams in the upper basin, intensive recreational or sport 
fishing competes with aboriginal food and commercial fishing. 
  In several portions of the basin, there are competing demands on dams and 
reservoirs to generate electrical power, reduce flood hazards, and maintain stream 
flows for fish habitat. 
  The largest quantity of wastewater discharges is at the estuary.  Three plants in 
the Greater Vancouver region release an estimated 429,000 cubic meters per day.  
Older systems combining stormwater and sewer tunnels result in combined sewer 
overflows that add millions of cubic meters per year of sewage to the river’s main 
stem and north arm.  A large number of lower-volume discharges to the Fraser 
River carry industrial wastes. (FREMP 1996; McGreer and Belzer 1999; Shaw 
and Tuominen 1999). 
  Forest fire 
 
    This is an enumeration of issues, not a presentation of a policy agenda.  Not all of 
these issues are within the jurisdiction of any single governmental entity, nor has the 
nongovernmental Fraser Basin Council embraced or addressed them all. 
Although there are serious water resource management problems in the Fraser 
basin, there are also favorable situations not found in some of the other cases studied for 
this project.  There remain undeveloped headwaters with pristine water quality.  The 
main stem of the Fraser River has never been dammed, and will not be in the future due 
to its designation in Canadian policy as a Heritage River.  The large size of the river 
basin, the large volume of flow on the main stem in normal years, and the fact that urban 
development has been concentrated mainly near the river mouth have reduced the 
negative impacts on the basin as a whole. 
    The principal groups of stakeholders affected by or trying to address the resource 
management issues in the Fraser basin are: 
 
  B.C. Hydro—a Crown corporation
5 that provides hydroelectric power throughout 
the province of British Columbia, and which owns and operates facilities on 
tributaries in the basin. 
                                                 
5 That is, a governmental corporation established by and for the province of British Columbia.   10
  First Nations—as mentioned earlier, there are dozens of First Nations 
communities in the basin, for whom the natural resources of the area have 
economic, subsistence, and historical-cultural significance. 
  Port Authorities—The Fraser is a “working river,” and its flow characteristics as 
well as the placement of in-channel and adjacent infrastructure (e.g., bridges, 
docks) are of vital significance to the managers of port authorities that attempt to 
promote and regulate river traffic. 
  Mining—Part of the contemporary economy as well as the regional heritage of 
British Columbia (which had its own “gold rush” in the latter 1800s), metal and 
aggregate mines both consume and discharge water in the Fraser basin. 
  Timber/forestry—Both in terms of land area and economic significance, forestry 
is one of the largest sectors in all of British Columbia and in the Fraser basin in 
particular.  Timber harvesting is intertwined with several elements of the basin, 
from erosion concerns to the use of portions of the river for log shipment. 
  Pulp and paper manufacturing—As would be expected in a region with such large 
timber operations, pulp and paper manufacturing is another large industry.  Like 
mining, they both consume and discharge significant volumes of water and waste. 
  Industry—Other manufacturing, particularly in the lower Fraser valley including 
the Greater Vancouver metropolitan area, relies upon water from the river basin 
and contributes wastes to it. 
  Agriculture—As noted earlier, farming and ranching are significant operations in 
the interior, and the Fraser Valley is one of the most important food production 
regions in Canada. 
  Commercial fishing—Salmon, sturgeon, and other valuable species are harvested 
from the Fraser and its tributaries and lakes, and support the livelihood of many 
basin residents and businesses.  Deterioration of water quality and fish habitat, 
and competing claims of fishing rights from First Nations are substantial interests 
of the commercial fishers in the basin. 
  Recreation and tourism—The rivers, lakes, estuary, mountains, and cities and 
towns of the Fraser basin provide a plethora of recreational opportunities for 
Canadian and non-Canadian visitors alike.  Greater Vancouver is a very popular 
tourism destination (or point of origin, as for cruise ships), and the 2010 Olympic 
Winter Games will be centered in Whistler, a skiing and tourism center north of 
Vancouver.  These industries are affected by, and affect, water quality and other 
environmental conditions within the basin. 
  Environmental organizations—Nongovernmental organizations concerned with 
preservation of open space, protection of endangered species, improvement of 
river water quality and other issues are found throughout the basin.  There is also 
an umbrella organization with which several organizations are affiliated—the 
British Columbia Environmental Network (BCEN). 
  Federal agencies—As described a bit further below, agencies of the Canadian 
national government have responsibilities in the basin, requiring their attention 
and involvement in many or most basin-related projects or programs. 
  Provincial agencies—Also noted below, the British Columbia government as a 
whole and several of its ministries have responsibilities in the Fraser basin, which 
is after all where the vast majority of British Columbians reside.   11
 
6. The Fraser Basin Council and Other Institutional Arrangements for Basin 
Management 
Unique among the cases studied for this project, the Fraser River basin has a pair of non-
governmental organizations as its principal governance and management institutions—
the Fraser Basin Council Society and the Fraser Basin Council.  The society is a non-
profit, charitable organization governed by a board of directors and able to receive 
funding from public and private sources.  Its principal function is to provide a legal 
foundation for the Fraser Basin Council.  In this capacity, the society acts as custodian of 
the council’s constitution and bylaws.  Members of the society are empowered to elect 
the officers of the society (i.e., president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer) who, in 
turn, become the officers of the council (chair, vice-chair, and executive director).  
The Fraser Basin Council is a multi-organizational, multi-interest planning body 
composed of 36 representatives drawn from diverse geographical and sectoral 
communities within the basin, as well as from what are called in Canada the four orders 
of government—federal, provincial, local/regional, and First Nations.  Although the 
Fraser Basin Council Society is essential to the existence and funding of the Fraser Basin 
Council and its activities, the council is actually the body that addresses, discusses, and 
decides upon basin planning and management priorities and activities.  The Fraser Basin 
Council will therefore receive more attention in the remainder of this paper than the 
society. 
The society and council themselves are of fairly recent origin, dating from 1997.  
They have emerged, though, from a process that can be dated to a sequence of events in 
the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s, and they are the outgrowth of a predecessor 
organization, the Fraser Basin Management Board, which existed from 1992 through 
1997.  To understand the reasons for the Fraser Basin Council’s existence, composition, 
and operation, it is important to understand the intergovernmental context of the Fraser 
River basin, and two processes that preceded the creation of the society and council—the 
Fraser River Estuary Management Program (FREMP) and the Fraser Basin Management 
Program (FBMP). 
6.1 The Intergovernmental Context 
Canada’s federal system gives provincial legislatures power over natural resources, 
including inland waterways and lakes.  Thus, most major water uses in the Fraser River 
basin operate under permits or licenses issued by British Columbia authorities, operating 
primarily from the provincial capital in Victoria. 
However, both the national Parliament and the provincial legislatures have power 
over agriculture, with national law prevailing if it conflicts with provincial law.   
Furthermore, Parliament has exclusive power over regulation of interprovincial and 
international trade; navigation and shipping; the fisheries; and First Nations.  Federal 
jurisdiction applies to the conservation and protection of oceans, fisheries, navigation, 
and international relations (including boundary waters with the U.S.), and to water on 
federal lands, in national parks, and in First Nations’ communities.  Moreover, the 
national government can offer the provinces and territories funding to administer 
programs and services in accord with national standards.   12
Therefore it is not possible to say simply that natural resources (particularly 
water) are a provincial matter in the Canada, in light of the federal government’s roles in 
agriculture, navigation, fisheries, and First Nations affairs, and its ability to offer funding 
to provinces for following federal guidelines in other matters.  As one interviewee 
characterized both the prospects for confusion and the need for intergovernmental 
coordination, the fish in the water are federal fish and the boats in the water are federal 
boats but the water is provincial water. 
The distribution of authority and responsibility between the provincial and federal 
governments is compounded by the horizontal distribution of water-related 
responsibilities within each government.  Environment Canada (EC) and the Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) are the principal federal agencies involved in water 
resources management.  EC compiles water quality and quantity data and sets water 
quality guidelines.  DFO is involved in management and protection of anadromous fish 
stocks and their habitats, and operates or promotes stock enhancement plans and habitat 
protection programs.  Other federal agencies with responsibilities that often affect water 
resources are the Department of Canadian Heritage, which coordinates the federal-
provincial Heritage Rivers program (the Fraser is one), and Infrastructure Canada which 
provides matching funds for investment in projects that may include municipal water and 
wastewater treatment plants. 
    Three provincial ministries in British Columbia have significant roles in the 
planning, management, and protection of water resources, environmental quality, and 
public health.  The Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection (MWLAP) regulates and 
protects water quality and quantity through monitoring and source water protection 
efforts.  The Ministry of Sustainable Resource Management is the lead agency at the 
provincial level for planning, policy development, and information provision regarding 
the sustainable economic development of Crown land and water resources,
6 and 
undertakes strategic planning regarding the long-term management and protection of 
natural resources in the province.  The Ministry of Health Services regulates drinking 
water quality delivered to the public (although MWLAP has responsibility for protecting 
drinking water sources). 
Provincial government in British Columbia also delegates vital responsibilities to 
local governments (primarily municipalities and regional districts) for drinking water 
treatment and distribution, and wastewater collection, treatment, and disposal.  In British 
Columbia, local governments that are potentially relevant to water resources include 
incorporated municipalities (cities, districts, towns, and villages), regional districts, and 
special purpose improvement districts.  Local government revenues are derived primarily 
from property taxes and intergovernmental grants from the provincial government. 
    Overall, water resource management in British Columbia involves all orders of 
government—federal, provincial, local, and First Nations—and involves many agencies 
and organizations (Table 1).  There are by one count 13 government agencies involved in 
some aspect of drinking water management in British Columbia, with cross-agency 
meetings convened from time to time by personnel at the Ministry of Health Services. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The vast majority of land and natural resources (including water) in British Columbia is owned by the 
government, and available for private development and use under terms of rental or lease.   13
Table 1. Principal agencies and functions in the Fraser Basin 
 
Order (level) 









Fisheries and Oceans 
Manages anadromous fish 
stocks and habitat  Fisheries Act 
Infrastructure Canada 
Matching funds for water/ 









Ministry of Water, 
Land and Air 
Protection (MWLAP) 
Regulates water resource 





Centre (now part of 
MWLAP) 





Develops water resources, 
provides guidance and 
leadership on water policy 
and planning  Numerous 
Land and Water B.C., 
Inc. 
Manages surface water 
allocation by issuing licenses  Water Act 
Ministry of Health 
Services 


























Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada 
Administers potable water 
supplies on reserves  Indian Act 
Source: Calbick et al. 2004 
 
The distribution of resource management responsibilities across agencies and 
orders of government in the Fraser River basin has not prevented governments and their 
personnel from working together on important initiatives and sustaining them over time.  
One example is the Canada-British Columbia Water Quality Monitoring Agreement, 
established in 1985 and still in effect.  Under this agreement, government personnel have 
performed bi-weekly sampling and reporting of results on the presence of ions, nutrients, 
trace metals and an indicator of industrial discharges from a number of locations in the 
basin.  Water quality monitoring on the main stem of the Fraser River at Hope has   14
occurred every two weeks since 1979, with other water quality indicators added to the 
testing protocol in 1987 and 1991.  The same monitoring has occurred on the river at 
Marguerite and Hansard since 1985, and at Stoner since 1990, and on the Thompson and 
Nechako rivers since 1985.  B.C. government has also participated extensively in federal-
provincial irrigation and drainage and flood-control programs, and has provided funding 
for additional flood protection projects on its own. 
Intergovernmental cooperation in natural resource management activities is 
certainly not out of the question, but even when it works well it entails high coordination 
costs.  Furthermore, the cooperation of government agency personnel does not 
necessarily bring other basin stakeholders into a process of information development and 
sharing, communication, and decision making.  An important example in a portion of the 
Fraser River Basin, the Fraser River Estuary Management Program, demonstrated the 
benefits and the drawbacks of the inter-agency partnership approach. 
 
6.2 The Fraser River Estuary Management Program 
Detailed in Calbick et al. (2004: 51-54), the Fraser River Estuary Management Program 
emerged from a study initiated in 1977, proceeded through some organizational 
modifications in the mid-1980s (see Table 2), and still operates today.  Noted observer 
and scholar Anthony Dorcey has characterized it as the most successful coastal zone 
management program in Canada (Dorcey 1990). 
 






Fraser Basin programs and 
organizations Related  events 
1977     
1978     
1979     
1980     
1981     
1982     
1983     
1984 
Fraser River Estuary 
Study, guided by 
federal-provincial 
steering committee 
(1977-80) and Fraser 
River Estuary 
Planning Committee 
(1980-84)     
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    The Fraser River estuary is by far the most populated and developed freshwater-
ocean interface on the Pacific coast of Canada.  As the Fraser River approaches the 
Pacific, the river diverges into three “arms” which flow through the Greater Vancouver 
metropolis and empty into the Strait of Georgia between the mainland and Vancouver 
Island.  Port facilities, river traffic, salmon and sturgeon fisheries, urban wastewater and 
stormwater disposal, and a host of other interest and uses converge in this estuarine 
region.  Concerns about the degradation of water quality in the estuary, protection of fish 
habitat and the livelihoods of fishers, and preservation or even expansion of river 
transportation as an essential element of the regional economy rose in the 1970s along 
with governmental policy interest in coastal zone management and comprehensive basin 
planning. 
Thus began the Fraser River Estuary Study in 1977 under a federal-provincial 
agreement, guided by a federal-provincial steering committee.  After an initial three-year 
phase, the scope of the study and the composition of the steering committee were 
broadened.  The steering committee became the Fraser River Estuary Planning 
Committee, which later published a report outlining a number of options and actions to 
be taken for improving estuary conditions and accommodating the multiple and 
sometimes conflicting uses therein.  This report was revised and adopted by the federal 
and provincial governments and two port authorities in 1985 as the Fraser River Estuary 
Management Program (FREMP).  FREMP operates with a five-agency executive, 
consisting of representatives from each of the two federal agencies, two port authorities, 
and the provincial ministry that signed the agreement establishing the program.  Those   16
five plus 27 at-large members constitute the FREMP Management Committee; the at-
large members represent other provincial and federal governmental agencies, local 
governments and regional districts, and several First Nations.  Thus FREMP’s structure 
involves considerable representation of governmental personnel.  Through FREMP, 
coordinated review of permit applications within the estuary has been improved among 
governments, and detailed management plans have been developed and agreed for major 
environmental subsystems within the estuary. 
 
6.3 The Fraser Basin Management Program, and the Fraser Basin Management 
Board 
FREMP has been a success, but it involved intensive and sustained collaboration among 
multiple federal, provincial, and local governments.  It has been criticized, furthermore, 
for lacking a formal place for non-governmental organizations.  When efforts began to 
focus on developing a plan for improving the conditions of the entire Fraser River—in 
1990-91 with the creation of the Fraser Basin Start-Up Committee, the Fraser Basin 
Action Plan, and the Fraser Basin Management Program—what emerged was the idea of 
a basin management board responsible for planning and executing projects, with input 
and funding from governmental agencies and with participation by First Nations and 
nongovernmental bodies.  On May 26, 1992, an agreement was reached among the 
principal federal agencies, DFO and EC, and the provincial government to initiate a five-
year Fraser Basin Management Program (FBMP) and to have it led by the Fraser Basin 
Management Board (FBMB).  The FBMB was intended to be a multi-organizational, 
multi-interest committee with the purpose of encouraging consensus-based decision 
making about basin activities and with a commitment to employing consensus decision 
making itself. 
    The FBMB was the first basin-scale organization in the Fraser basin.  The board 
was composed of 19 members, with three representatives from each of the four orders of 
government in the Canadian political system (federal, provincial, local or regional, and 
First Nations) comprising 12 of the members, six more coming from non-governmental 
organizations representing economic, environmental, and social interests in the basin, and 
one appointed “neutral” chair (i.e., whose participation could not add to that of an 
organization or government agency already represented on the board).  Difficulties were 
encountered and adjustments were made during the FBMB’s first year in determining 
some of the six NGO and three First Nations representatives.  A good deal of effort 
during the FBMB’s early meetings was consumed by processes of communication and 
education, as board members of differing expertise and background, differing levels of 
familiarity with governmental processes, and differing locations within the basin had to 
learn how to understand one another and make themselves understood, and how to think 
about the basin as a whole rather than solely about their portion of it or their interest in it.  
They also had to reconcile their differing views of the board’s mission and scope of 
authority (Calbick et al. 2004: 59-60), since there was no predecessor organization on a 
basin scale from which the FBMB could evolve and adapt. 
    The FBMB in 1993 adopted a Strategic Plan, centered upon a set of principles to 
guide the implementation of the Fraser Basin Management Program.  These included 
meeting the needs of all people in the basin within the ecological constraints of the basin   17
itself; incorporating aboriginal interest and concerns; assuring the conservation and 
prudent management of renewable and nonrenewable resources; fostering equal and fair 
access to information and decision making processes; coordinating data collection, 
sharing, and analysis for the sake of encouraging integrated and innovative approaches to 
basin planning; and recognizing the need for adaptive and precautionary decision making.  
The FBMB established five goals for the FBMP, linked with five strategic programs and 
action plans, toward the end of adopting a “Strategy for Sustainability” by 1997, the end 
of the five-year agreement that had established the FBMP and FBMB. 
    Learning to apply and abide by consensus decision making was one of the board’s 
challenges through its five years.  The board adopted a method of relying upon task 
forces and committees established for each major topic or initiative, and then reflecting 
the diversity of interests on the whole board in the membership of those sub-units.  These 
multi-interest committees provided more opportunities for interpersonal information 
sharing and trust building, as well as providing some assurance for the board as a whole 
that when an initiative came to the board from a committee or task force it had already 
received some attention and input from most of the interests represented on the board. 
    The FBMB employed a professional staff and leased its own office space, rather 
than relying on the participating governmental agencies to provide these services.  It was, 
and is, an important measure of the support of the participating governments that they 
have made and sustained the financial commitments to make this possible.  The important 
functions performed by the FBMB staff—organizing meetings, researching basin issues, 
circulating minutes and memoranda among board members, developing reports and 
newsletters for media and public information—might have been assigned to staff from 
participating agencies instead, but they would have had to balance those tasks along with 
their other roles and responsibilities.  The FBMB staff was able to focus full-time on 
these matters instead.  This distinguished the FBMP effort from more traditional inter-
governmental or inter-agency partnerships, contributed to the confidence of participants 
in the transparency of information generation and sharing, and fostered perceptions of 
independence and legitimacy for the FBMP that reinforced the commitments of NGO and 
First Nations representatives. 
    A staffing decision of equal or even greater significance was taken in 1995, to 
hire regional coordinators and place them in four regions of the basin.  These regional 
coordinators gave the FBMP and FBMB a continuing presence in the main regions of the 
basin, rather than having all staff concentrated in Vancouver.  In light of the size of the 
Fraser River basin, the decision to employ regional coordinators had both symbolic and 
pragmatic significance: it communicated a tangible message to distant portions of the 
basin that they were important and that the FBMP wasn’t merely a set of activities to be 
run from Vancouver, and it gave individuals and organizations someone closer at hand to 
contact with questions, ideas, and requests for information.  The Fraser Basin Council has 
continued the practice of employing regional coordinators.  Participants interviewed for 
this project reported having good relationships with the coordinators for their respective 
regions, and indicated that the presence of the regional coordinators reinforced their own 
commitment to the basin planning and management efforts. 
    Another important practice initiated by FBMB and continued under the Fraser 
Basin Council has been the development of a set of “sustainability indicators” and the 
publication of a “State of the Basin” report.  The first report was published in 1995 and   18
contained sections on eight key issues in the basin.  It was accompanied by a briefer 
“Report Card,” grading progress in the basin on some of the more critical issues (Calbick 
et al. 2004: 66).  Updated reports and report cards have been issued since, culminating 
with the publication of a “Snapshot on Sustainability: State of the Fraser Basin” report in 
2003. 
The greatest significance of this effort is the explicit incorporation of assessment 
methods and progress reporting into the basin governance and management structure, 
with the development of data that can be monitored over time to document changes in 
basin conditions.  Fraser Basin Council staff interviewed for this project likened the 
sustainability indicators and the state of the basin reports to “vital signs” being used to 
“monitor the basin’s health.”  Data concerning the sustainability indicators can be used to 
establish priorities for attention and action in basin regions or for the basin as a whole. 
 
6.4 The Charter for Sustainability and the Fraser Basin Council 
As the five-year Fraser Basin Management Program neared its end in 1997, the 
participants on the FBMB drew together a kind of constitutional document for the Fraser 
River basin, which is titled the Charter for Sustainability and was published by the 
FBMB successor Fraser Basin Council (Fraser Basin Council 1997).  The most striking 
aspect of the charter is the tremendous breadth that is given to the concept of basin 
sustainability, which extends far beyond the water resource focus common to the other 
cases studied for this project.  A sense of this breadth is conveyed by the document’s 
vision statement, four directions, and twelve principles, shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. The Fraser Basin Sustainability Concept 
 
Vision: The Fraser basin is a place where social well-being is supported by a vibrant 
economy and sustained by a healthy environment. 
 
Four Directions   
Understanding 
Sustainability 
Governments, community groups and individuals recognize why and 
how they can contribute to building vibrant communities, developing 
strong and diverse economies, and maintaining the air, water, land 
and living species that make up ecosystems. 
Caring for 
Ecosystems 
Individuals are all stewards of resources such as water, forests, fish, 
wildlife and land.  Individuals, as stewards, conserve and enhance 
ecosystems to maintain strong and diverse economies and to support 
growing communities.  In this way, people not only enjoy a natural 
environment, but also conserve it to support a high quality of life. 
Strengthening 
Communities 
Communities benefit from local experience, skills and values.  Strong 
communities are built on a diverse economy, an educated workplace, 
safe neighborhoods, accessibility to basic commodities, shared goals, 
local action and a sense of belonging. 
Improving 
Decision Making 
Decision making is shared and people work together to reach creative 
agreements and achieve common goals.  These reflect the interests of 
a  growing  population mixed in gender, culture, religion, age and   19
interest; and where aboriginal rights now being defined are reconciled 
in a just and fair manner. 
 
Twelve Principles   
Mutual Dependence  Land, water, air and all living organisms including humans, are 
integral parts of the ecosystem.  Biodiversity must be conserved. 
Accountability  All residents are responsible for the social, economic and 
environmental consequences of their decisions and accountable 
for their actions. 
Equity  All communities and regions must have equal opportunities to 
provide for the social, economic and environmental needs of 
residents. 
Integration  Consideration of social, economic and environmental costs and 
benefits must be an integral part of all decision making. 
Adaptive 
Approaches 
Plans and activities must be adaptable and able to respond to 
external pressures and changing social values. 
Coordinated and 
Cooperative Efforts 
Coordinated and cooperative efforts are needed among all 
government and non-government interests. 
Open and Informed 
Decision Making 
Open decision making depends on the best available information. 
Exercising  Caution  Caution must be exercised when shaping decisions to avoid 
making irreversible mistakes. 
Managing 
Uncertainty 
A lack of certainty should not prevent decisive actions for 
sustainability. 
Recognition  There must be recognition of existing rights, agreements and 
obligations in all decision making. 
Aboriginal Rights 
and Title 
We recognize that aboriginal nations within the Fraser basin 
assert aboriginal rights and title.  These rights and title now being 




Sustainability is a journey that requires constant feedback, 
learning and adjustment.  In the short term, the elements of 
sustainability may not always be in balance. 
Source: Fraser Basin Council 1997 
 
The breadth of the basin sustainability concept is further illustrated by the 
following list of basin-wide and regional concerns that have been the subject of Fraser 
Basin Council programs or have been topics for discussion on the agenda of the council 
or one or more of its committees: 
 
  Maintaining a healthy estuary at the mouth of the Fraser River 
  Managing waterborne debris in the lower basin 
  Removal of gravel accumulation in the lower Fraser River 
  Cleaning up pollution from the Britannia Mine (which is not located in the Fraser 
Basin but the clean-up effort was led by the Basin Council) 
  Flood preparation   20
  Flood hazard reduction 
  Erosion 
  Deteriorating water quality in some lakes and streams 
  Maintaining healthy fisheries and fish habitat 
  Habitat loss 
  Growth management 
  Increasing population in the lower basin 
  Urbanization and urban sprawl in the lower basin 
  Transportation congestion in the lower basin 
  Air pollution in the lower basin 
  Loss of agricultural land 
  Invasive species 
  Forest devastation from Mountain Pine Beetle epidemic and increased risk of 
forest fires 
  Conflicts over land use, especially at the urban/rural interface 
  Dependence of many communities on single industries; need for economic 
diversification 
  Access to health care 
  Effective transportation links in the upper areas of the basin 
  Population and economic losses in rural communities, especially in the Cariboo-
Chilcotin region 
  Improving aboriginal/non-aboriginal relations 
  Ensuring that the 2010 Olympic Winter Games are sustainable 
  Dealing effectively with crime and other social problems 
 
As the list indicates, the Fraser Basin Council has embraced a conception of “the 
basin” that involves much more than usual ideas of river basin management, and a 
conception of sustainability that has social and economic elements as well as 
environmental ones.  The breadth of the council’s interests and activities results from the 
combined effects of its membership composition, the size and diversity of the basin itself, 
and the institutional imperative of the council’s need to sustain itself financially by 
getting involved in a number of projects for which funding is available. 
Among the principal goals of the Fraser Basin Council has been to promote a 
perspective of interdependency and relationship among residents and communities 
throughout this very large basin.  The FBC staff cite examples such as these, which are 
also found in Calbick et al. (2004): 
 
•  Upstream pulp mills contaminate fish hundreds of kilometers downstream in the 
estuary. 
•  Diversion of water from headwater streams reduces flows in the Fraser River 
mainstem, increasing the concentration of pollutants and contributing to low-flow 
conditions that threaten fish migration. 
•  Fishing in the coastal and estuarine portions of the river basin intercepts migratory 
fish and reduces up-river catch. 
•  Air pollution from the Greater Vancouver area blows eastward and contaminates 
the inland reaches of the Fraser Valley.   21
•  Over-fishing in the lower portions of the river basin shifts fishing activity 
upstream. 
•  Declining stocks of mature timber in the lower sub-basins shift demands to the 
upper sub-basins. 
•  Loss of forest cover in the upper sub-basins aggravates erosion and flood hazards 
downstream. 
 
The breadth of the Fraser Basin Council’s agenda is reflected in, and reflects, 
some of its organizational characteristics.  As noted earlier, the council is composed of 36 
members, an expansion from the predecessor FBMB.  Furthermore, Fraser Basin Council 
seats are deliberately distributed so that no sector of basin interests or level of 
government has a majority of members and so non-water as well as water-related basin 
interests are represented.  Table 4 provides the breakdown of Fraser Basin Council 
representation. 
 
Table 4. Composition of Fraser Basin Council members 
 
Number of 
members  Category of representation or interest 
3  Federal government agencies, typically one from DFO, one from EC and 
one from the 10 other relevant departments. 
3  Provincial government agencies, typically one from Ministry of 
Sustainable Resource Management, one from Ministry of Water, Land and 
Air Protection, and one from Land and Water B.C. or Ministry of Health 
Services 
8 Regional  districts—these  are local government units larger than the scale 
of a municipality but below the province level.  The Fraser basin 
encompasses eight regional districts.  Regional district representatives may 
be from regional district governments or from municipalities or other local 
government units within a regional district 
8  First Nations representatives—one from each of the eight language groups 
in the basin, chosen by the tribal councils of the First Nations associated 
with that language group 
10  Regional representatives—two non-government individuals from each of 
the five regions of the Fraser Basin designated by the Fraser Basin Council 
1  Basin-wide representative with a perspective on economic sustainability 
1  Basin-wide representative with a perspective on social sustainability 
1  Basin-wide representative with a perspective on environmental 
sustainability 
1  Impartial chair who serves as president of the council 
36 Total 
Source: Calbick et al. 2004 
 
The membership structure conveys the diversity of represented interests fairly 
well, but not entirely.  Several members wear “multiple hats,” representing for instance 
not only a geographic region in the basin but also an interest sector (e.g., a regional   22
representative who is also a rancher, or one who is employed by a mining company, or 
who works in forestry, etc.)  Thus, depending on the particular group of individuals 
serving on the council at a time, the 36 seats place even more than 36 interests at the table 
for council meetings. 
  The presence of eight First Nations’ representatives on the council makes it a 
unique organization, in British Columbia, in Canada, and perhaps internationally.  The 
sustained effort to incorporate aboriginal along with non-aboriginal interests on the 
council, and in more than a merely token fashion, was mentioned by several interviewees 
as not only a distinctive feature of the council but a very positive one. 
    The Fraser Basin Council has continued the FBMB practice of maintaining 
consensus-based decision making.  Each policy recommendation or programmatic 
involvement of the council has to be acceptable to all members; otherwise, the matter is 
continued for further discussion and refinement, or dropped. 
    As noted earlier, the Fraser Basin Council had maintained the earlier FBMB 
practice of employing regional coordinators in addition to the staff in Vancouver.  The 
council has divided the Fraser basin into five regions, shown in Figure 2, based primarily 
on sub-basin groupings but also reflecting some jurisdictional boundaries (particularly 
regional districts).  These are the basis not only for the assignment of regional 
coordinators but for the designation of regional representatives on the council noted in 
Table 4. 
 
•  The Greater Vancouver-Squamish-Pemberton region, which includes the Lower 
Fraser sub-basin and the Greater Vancouver and Squamish-Lillooet Regional 
Districts; 
•  The Fraser Valley region, which includes the Lillooet Sub-basin and the Fraser 
Valley Regional District; 
•  The Thompson region, which includes the North Thompson, South Thompson, 
Thompson/Nicola, and Bridge-Seton sub-basins, and the Thompson-Nicola and 
Columbia-Shuswap Regional Districts; 
•  The Cariboo-Chilcotin region, which includes the Quesnel, West 
Road/Blackwater, Chilcotin, and Middle Fraser sub-basins, and the Cariboo 
Regional District; and  
•  The Upper Fraser region, which includes the Upper Fraser, Nechako, and Stuart-
Takla sub-basins and the Fraser-Fort George and Bulkley-Nechako Regional 
Districts. 
   23
 
 
Figure 2. Fraser Basin Council Designated Regions of the Fraser River Basin 
Source: Fraser Basin Council, www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/regions/index.html 
 
    The breadth of the Fraser Basin Council’s conception of basin sustainability is 
also reflected in its programs and its finances.  A sampling of Fraser Basin Council 




  Flood Hazard Management 
  Strengthening Communities 
  Invasive Plant Strategy for British Columbia 
  Sustainable Fisheries Strategy 
  First Nations Action Plan 
Regional programs 
  Britannia Mine Reclamation and Remediation 
  Greater Vancouver Regional District Sustainable Region Initiative 
  Agricultural Nutrient Management 
  Shuswap Lake Water Quality 
  Caribou Management 
  Chilako Watershed Council   24
  Nechako River Environmental Enhancement 
 
Apart from the facts that this is a partial list and that the Fraser Basin Council is in 
only its seventh year of existence, this diverse agenda of programs also aids in 
understanding an important point about the Fraser Basin Council’s finances.  Unlike its 
predecessor organization, the FBMB, the Fraser Basin Council has moved beyond total 
reliance on funding support from government agencies and added “project funding,” i.e. 
funding that comes from public and private organizations that contract with the Fraser 
Basin Council to perform a study, organize an event or program, administer a project, etc.  
The Fraser Basin Council still relies on core funding support from federal, provincial, and 
local government annual contributions, but that funding has declined from 95% of the 
council’s revenue in 1998 to 51% of its revenue in 2003, while project funding has grown 
from 4% of council revenue in 1998 to 36% in 2003.  (It is important to note that the 
budget contributions from federal, provincial, and local governments have not declined in 
amount, just proportion; the Fraser Basin Council’s revenue has roughly doubled since 
1998, and project revenue accounts for the vast majority of the increase.) 
    In addition to programs such as those listed above and in Calbick et al. (2004), the 
Fraser Basin Council has continued and expanded the public information and outreach 
programs started by the FBMB in the mid-1990s.  The Fraser Basin Council published 
another State of the Basin report in 2000, along with a shorter “Snapshot on 
Sustainability” in 2003, followed by an update in 2004.  In conjunction with these 
reports, the council staff continue to refine and expand the list of “sustainability 
indicators” begun in 1995, based on feedback from readers of the reports as well as the 
availability or development of new data sources.  The council also publishes an annual 
report of its activities, organization, and finances.  Over the last five years, the council 
has added a new dimension to its public reporting and outreach with State of the Fraser 
Basin Conferences.  These biennial conferences, begun in 1998, bring individuals and 
organizations throughout the basin together not only for a day of information sharing 
about basin conditions but also for discussion of issues of basin-wide significance and 
impact. 
 
7. Participants’ Motivations, Incentives, and Actions 
A non-governmental organization responsible for basin planning and monitoring, inter-
organizational coordination, and public information, which has managed to double its 
annual revenues since 1998 and extend its involvement to more than a dozen basinwide 
and sub-basin programs raises important questions about why and how participants have 
created and sustained it.  The questions are even relevant to the five-year period of the 
FBMB prior to the establishment of the Fraser Basin Council. 
As Calbick et al. (2004: 61) point out, federal and provincial agencies and their 
representatives viewed the FBMB as an instrument—a way of achieving the inter-
organizational coordination they knew they needed in order to achieve basin management 
priorities.  Local government representatives viewed the FBMB and its programs as a 
means of securing priority funding for important local and regional projects from federal 
and provincial authorities.  First Nations representatives viewed it as one of the first open 
recognitions of their status as one of the four orders of government, and as a forum for 
airing their concerns in the basin (primarily regarding fishery allocations).  Non-  25
governmental organizations who participated in its advisory bodies viewed it as a means 
of influencing governmental policy decisions. 
Based on the interviews conducted for this project, the creation of the Fraser 
Basin Council with a broader representation and agenda has underscored those 
motivations and added others.  Federal agencies have been willing to fund, send 
representatives to and cooperate in programs with the Fraser Basin Council because it 
allows them to influence resource management issues that might otherwise be beyond 
their constitutional authority, and because the council is an organization to which the 
federal agencies can hand off problems and concerns for investigation and discussion.  
The council also allows the agencies to satisfy statutory and regulatory obligations for 
public participation in basin management programs. 
Provincial ministries and their representatives find in the Fraser Basin Council a 
means to break out of the substantial inter-agency fragmentation of water resources 
responsibilities at the provincial level, overcome budgetary limitations on their resources, 
engage greater participation, and have an organization to which they can hand off 
problems for investigation and discussion.  As with the federal agencies and their 
representatives, these benefits of council participation suffice for provincial ministries to 
maintain their annual financial support of the council. 
With its breadth of representation and its consensus-based approach to decision 
making, the Fraser Basin Council provides valued political cover and leverage for federal 
and provincial agency personnel.  An issue that has been investigated and discussed by 
the basin council, and on which the council has arrived at a consensus recommendation 
for actions to be taken, is in much stronger position to be implemented by federal and 
provincial agencies.  
Furthermore, the council’s consensus approach to decision making has helped to 
assure and maintain federal and provincial agency representation.  By definition, agency 
representatives serving on a consensus-based group are shielded from being in the 
position of belonging to an organization that takes positions contrary to federal or 
provincial policy.  The council would be unable to come to consensus on any such 
position. 
Other Fraser Basin Council participants (the local government, First Nations, and 
regional and sectoral representatives) get access to good information, a chance to raise 
issues and concerns in a forum where federal and provincial representatives are listening, 
and opportunities for coalition building to enhance their political influence.  In addition to 
being a body to which governmental agencies can hand off problems or issues for study 
and deliberation (as noted above), the Fraser Basin Council serves as a forum through 
which issues can “bubble up” from stakeholders to provincial and federal policy makers.  
Here too the consensus approach provides an incentive to participation, since it 
effectively places these stakeholder representatives on an equal plane with representatives 
from federal and provincial agencies that have the constitutional and statutory authority 
as well as the budgetary resources most local, aboriginal, and sectoral representatives 
lack.  The Fraser Basin Council itself has no constitutional or statutory authority to 
execute decisions on resource management policy, but its structure and operation place 
the officials who have that authority at a table (literally and figuratively) with other 
stakeholders in the basin and this is an important element of their continued commitment 
to it.   26
Not to be overlooked are the solidarity benefits that accrue to the individuals who 
serve on the council.  Thanks to the work of the Fraser Basin Council staff, council 
gatherings such as the one observed for this project incorporated plenty of opportunities 
for enjoyable interactions among what has proved to be a very sociable group.  At least 
one of the motivations for individuals to sustain a voluntary commitment to several 
meetings over a number of years is that the meetings include some conviviality, and it 
appears that council members have built a number of genuine friendships through their 
interactions. 
The Fraser Basin Council staff interviewed and observed for this project appear to 
have been drawn to council employment and stayed with it for years based on a couple of 
factors.  One is internal commitment to sustainability principles that the council 
articulates and espouses—several staff appear to have been devoted to concepts of 
environmental, social, and/or economic sustainability before they joined the council staff, 
and thus their employment offers them an opportunity to put principles into practice.  
That motivation is reinforced by the belief that the Fraser Basin Council is an 
organization that is truly making a positive difference, in ways that go beyond the 
opportunities that might be available with a more traditional non-governmental 
organization.  Staff appear to be enthused about being part of an organization they 
associate with real action in addition to research and advocacy. 
Of course, staff (especially managerial staff) also want to secure adequate funding 
to maintain the personnel and space that keep the council operating at a high level.  This 
leads them not only to work closely with council members, but sometimes to pursue 
projects that seem only tangentially related to basin management concerns.  A recurring 
topic of discussion within the staff and among the council is whether a particular project 
that has been brought to the council’s attention for possible involvement is too far afield 
from the council’s principal concerns.  Staff and council members freely acknowledged 
that there have been occasions when funding opportunities associated with involvement 
in one or another project have stretched the council’s own broadly defined scope and 
agenda rather far. 
 
8. Application of the Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework used in this research project, mentioned in Section 2 above and 
outlined in the Appendix to this paper, highlights several institutional variables that are 
hypothesized to be associated with progress or difficulty in achieving integrated water 
resources management at the river basin scale through decentralized institutional 
arrangements.  Applying that framework to the Fraser basin case yields the following 
observations. 
 
8.1 Contextual factors and initial conditions 
At least three factors about the Fraser basin setting contribute to its prospects for 
successful basin management.  One is the level of economic development of the nation, 
and a second is the level of economic development of the basin.  Canada generally, and 
the Fraser basin particularly, are prosperous enough that policy makers and stakeholders 
have some resources to devote to research, institution building, meetings, projects of   27
environmental improvement, and monitoring and assessment.  A third is the initial 
distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; for good or ill as a matter of 
economic policy, it happens to be the case that the vast majority of land and water 
resources in the Fraser basin are held as a public trust by the province of British 
Columbia or the Government of Canada and are used by private individuals under lease 
arrangements.  This situation has allowed institutional arrangements to develop in the 
basin under conditions where no one interest or sector of basin users enjoys across-the-
board priority or privilege in its claims to resource use—in other words, urban uses are 
not all privileged over rural ones or vice versa, mining over agriculture or vice versa, etc. 
    One aspect of the initial conditions in the Fraser basin presents a challenge, 
namely, the presence of social and cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders.  The 
claims and title of aboriginal peoples (First Nations) versus the established economic and 
political power of the non-aboriginal descendants of European settlers has been a difficult 
issue of long standing throughout Canada, and this is certainly true of the Fraser basin.  
First Nations and non-aboriginal residents have had difficulty working together, 
understanding one another, and forging institutional arrangements for joint problem 
solving.  The First Nations issue is never far from the surface of any natural resource 
issue in the Fraser basin or elsewhere in Canada. 
 
8.2 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
In this as in some of the other cases in this research project, it has not always been clear 
that there has been a “decentralization process” strictly so called.  The construction of 
basin-scale institutional arrangements in the Fraser basin appears to be as much or more a 
matter of integrating already decentralized organizations and jurisdictions rather than 
decentralizing previously centralized ones.  Nevertheless, some of the considerations in 
this category are definitely relevant to the Fraser Basin case.  One is the extent of central 
government recognition of local-level basin governance, which has been extraordinarily 
positive.  Not only did the Canadian national and British Columbian provincial 
governments join in the predecessor organizations in the basin (the estuary steering 
committee, the basin management board) and fund the Fraser River Action Plan from 
1992 through 1998, but they have been original and consistent members of the Fraser 
Basin Council and have supported it financially. 
Another factor has been the consistency of that support through changes of 
government and administration at both the provincial and federal levels.  Although Fraser 
Basin Council members and staff are always alert to the possibility that electoral changes 
of government might bring shifts in commitment, thus far the institutional arrangements 
for Fraser Basin management have maintained support from both levels through electoral 
changes.  It remains to be seen how the council will cope with recent changes in the 
leadership structure.  Losing strong and committed champions who possess well-
developed managerial skills as well as political acumen can sometimes disrupt agency 
activities. 
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8.3 Characteristics of central-local relationships and capacities 
In a similar vein, there are a number of favorable factors in this category.  The financial 
resources and the financial autonomy of the Fraser Basin Council are quite strong, though 
they remain an important concern of the members and staff.  The council members have, 
through the Fraser Basin Society and the council’s own by-laws, the demonstrated ability 
to create and modify the institutional arrangements with which they work—vide the 
adoption of the Charter for Sustainability, and the transformation of the Fraser Basin 
Management Board into the Fraser Basin Society/Fraser Basin Council structure that 
exists today.  As suggested above, however, the water rights system is something of a 
mixed bag—on the one hand, the arrangements governing rights to water and land use 
allow for considerable management flexibility, but on the other, the control of 
groundwater resources is particularly weak and represents a current and future 
vulnerability to the water resource management aspects of the overall basin sustainability 
effort. 
 
8.4 Internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
The strongest features here are: the availability of a basin-level governance body (the 
council), the recognition of sub-basin communities of interest through the composition of 
the council with regional representatives and through its employment of regional 
coordinators, and the institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions by 
means that are trusted by resource users.  The Fraser Basin Council also was designed 
quite deliberately to provide information sharing and communication among basin 
stakeholders, to provide means for basin stakeholders to enter into agreements to take 
actions for improvement of basin conditions, and to resolve conflicts.  The one variable in 
this category that is not entirely favorable has to do with the clarity of institutional 
boundaries—while the Fraser Basin Council has emerged as the paramount deliberative 
body in the basin, in its capacity as a non-governmental organization funded through a 
non-profit society, the council generally cannot turn its decisions and plans into actions. 
It usually must hand off projects to other (usually governmental) entities for 
implementation, and at times even the council members are not entirely clear what 
actions are within the council’s scope.  Still, as discussed further below, the Fraser Basin 
Council’s existence as a non-governmental organization also carries some advantages. 
 
9. Performance Assessment 
The Fraser Basin Council regularly assesses basin conditions, and has even invested in 
review of its own structure and operations.  The council publishes annual reports, State of 
the Basin reports and snapshots on sustainability, and holds biennial conferences, all 
focused on basin conditions.  Calbick et al. (2004: 82-106) devote a chapter to compiling 
and summarizing information from these sources in a review of the council’s 
performance, which can be consulted for more details.  Here are a few natural resource-
related measures or indicators. 
   29
  Comparing the most recent decade with the historical record, the number of 
salmon returning to spawn has increased in half of the basin streams assessed. 
  Toxic discharges in the basin as a whole have declined due to municipal sewage 
treatment plant upgrades and the adoption of new technologies at pulp and paper 
plants. 
  Lower Fraser River bottom sediments have shown improving trends in lead 
concentrations. 
  Measured concentrations of most pollutants in the main stem of the Fraser River 
have not exceeded water quality guidelines.  The exceptions are iron and copper 
(which may be exceeded because of naturally high background levels in the basin) 
and the industrial wastewater indicator adsorbable organohalides (AOX) 
downstream of pulp and paper mills. 
  Chloride and AOX have declined in the Fraser River since 1991, reflecting 
changes in the pulp bleaching process.  Even though AOX amounts still exceed 
provincial guidelines from time to time, AOX is an indicator for a number of 
industrial contaminants, and direct measures of those contaminants have shown 
improvement and have persisted below provincial guidelines since 1995.   
Restrictions on fish consumption from the Fraser River upstream of Hope were 
lifted by the B.C. government in 1994, and on the Thompson River in 1995. 
  Fecal coliform concentrations have declined on the main stem of the Fraser River 
in the upper area, due to improved sewage treatment and disposal at upper area 
cities such as Fort George and Quesnel. 
  “Since FRAP’s inception [1992], a much clearer picture of the extent, sources, 
and potential mitigation of Fraser River pollution has been formed.  Water quality 
monitoring projects undertaken by DFO in partnership with EC have yielded 
important baseline information concerning contaminant levels in the Fraser River 
and its biota.  DFO Science Sector projects concerning the impact of 
contaminants on salmon have been particularly successful in identifying sub-
lethal effects of pollution…. Through FRAP, habitat-mapping and science studies 
were undertaken which would not have otherwise been carried out.  The legacy of 
these studies is a greater understanding of how the river ecosystem functions, 
particularly with regard to factors that affect its salmon.” (Calbick et al. 2004: 57). 
 
These changes in basin conditions are monitored by the Fraser Basin Council; not 
all changes or improvements result from FBC programs or activities. 
In 2002, the FBC employed a consulting firm in 2002 to interview council 
members, staff, and external observers to assess the council’s own performance and 
effectiveness (SALASAN Associates 2002).  The report reflected a mix of findings 
similar to the ones reached here: involvement in the FBC has been a satisfying experience 
for participants; the FBC’s status as a nongovernmental body and its broad representation 
are extremely helpful to addressing issues that cross agency domains and jurisdictional 
boundaries and to promoting inclusion of a wide range of perspectives; on the other hand, 
FBC occasionally gets involved in issues that are not as clearly related to its charter and 
runs some risk of loss of focus. 
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10. Conclusions 
Since one of the most distinctive features of this case is the role of the Fraser Basin 
Council as a non-governmental organization, some concluding comments are in order 
about how well that has worked in the Fraser Basin and its possible implications 
elsewhere.  It can certainly be argued that the NGO model reduces some of the 
bureaucratic “turf battles” that one would expect to be associated with placing basin 
management responsibility in an existing agency, or creating an agency that would have 
authority and responsibilities that were transferred from or overlapped with existing 
agencies.  The NGO approach also fits well with a federal system such as Canada’s, since 
it provides a means of crossing jurisdictional boundaries among levels of government in a 
context where a constitution divides authority and one level of government is not entirely 
superior or subordinate to the other.  It is also suited to a common-law cultural context 
where private organizations are free to do anything that isn’t forbidden by law, and to 
take actions (including the raising and distribution of funds) up to the limits of public 
authority. 
Furthermore, the NGO approach in the Fraser basin has allowed for the 
integration of First Nations and private stakeholders in ways that more traditional inter-
governmental programs have often found difficult if not impossible.  It has served as a 
good forum for information generation and sharing, since there is less concern over who 
“owns” the information.  An NGO has the boundary flexibility to cover the whole basin 
(which no local government can do) but not more than the basin (as would be the case for 
a provincial or federal agency).  As already noted in Section 7, an NGO of the Fraser 
Basin Council type also provides good political cover for agencies, who can justify 
actions that might otherwise be unpopular with some constituency. 
    The NGO approach epitomized by the Fraser Basin Council also has its 
weaknesses and drawbacks.  Most important is the fact that the council is generally 
unable to implement the plans and programs it agrees upon, and must hand them off to 
others—usually governmental agencies—for actual performance.  This limitation means 
that matters on which the council has made recommendations do not always get done or 
get done swiftly or without modification by the implementing agencies.  A more vigorous 
advocacy role, prodding governments or other bodies for action, has its own risks, 
however, as one of the council’s most important assets is its reputation for neutrality. 
Other vulnerabilities include the fact that the Fraser Basin Council’s consensus 
decision making approach, though helpful in a number of respects as noted in Section 7, 
is also time-consuming and can be frustrating.  As an NGO financially reliant upon good-
will contributions and funded projects, the Fraser Basin Council is subject to enough 
budgetary uncertainty (despite the consistency of governmental contributions to date) to 
limit its ability to commit to long-range projects.  An NGO in such a position is also 
continually vulnerable to “mission creep,” the temptation to follow the money that is 
available for projects that may be beyond its primary concerns and interests. 
    On balance, the approach represented by the Fraser Basin Council has worked 
well in this setting as a means of bridging fragmented public authorities and integrating 
indigenous and other private stakeholders.  It has succeeded so far in preserving a 
reputation for objectivity and avoiding widespread perception of bias, and in building a 
more diverse financial base.  The council’s structure, agenda, and performance are key  
reasons the Fraser basin has proved to be a valuable addition to this research project.   31
References 
Agrawal, Arun (2002) “Decentralization Policies and the Government of the 
Environment.” Polycentric Circles. Volume 8, Number 1 (January), pp. 4-5 
Alaerts, G.J. 1999. “Institutions for River Basin Management. The Role of External 
Support Agencies (International Donors) in Developing Cooperative 
Arrangements”, International Workshop on River Basin Management – Best 
Management Practices, Delft University of Technology/River Basin 
Administration (RBA), The Hague, October 27-29, 1999 
Allee, David J. 1988. “River Basin Management.” Proceedings of an Engineering 
Foundation Conference: the Role of Social and Behavioral Sciences in Water 
Resources Planning and Management. New York: NY.   
Blomquist, W. and E. Schlager. 1999. Watershed Management from the Ground Up: 
Political Science and the Explanation of Regional Governance Arrangements. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2-5, 1999. 54 pp. 
Bromley, D.W. 1989. Economic Interests and Institutions. New York: Basil Blackwell 
Calbick, K.S., Raymond McAllister, David Marshall and Steve Litke 2004. The Fraser 




Calbick, K.S., J.C. Day, and Thomas I. Gunton 2003. Land use planning implementation: 
A ‘best practices’ assessment. Environments 31(3):69-82 
Day, J.C. 1999 Planning for floods in the Lower Fraser Basin, British Columbia: Toward 
an integrated approach? Environments 27(1):49-66 
Day, J.C., Thomas I. Gunton, and Tanis M. Frame 2003. Toward environmental 
sustainability in British Columbia: The role of collaborative planning. 
Environments 31(2):21-38 
Dorcey, Anthony 1990. Sustainable development of the Fraser River Estuary: Success 
amidst failure.  Paper prepared for the Coastal Resources Management Group, 
Environment Directorate, OECD, Paris 
Dorcey, A.H.L. 1991. Water in Sustainable Development: Exploring our common future 
in the Fraser Basin. Westwater Research Centre, Univ. of B.C. 288 pp.  
Easter, K. William and Robert R. Hearne (1993) “Decentralizing Water Resource 
Management: Economic Incentives, Accountability, and Assurance.” Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 1219. Washington, DC: The World Bank 
Fraser Basin Council 1997. The charter for sustainability. Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin 
Council 
Fraser River Estuary Management Program 1996. The Fraser River estuary: 
Environmental quality report. Burnaby, B.C.: Fraser River Estuary Management 
Program 
Galloway, Gerald E. (1997) “River Basin Management in the 21
st Century: Blending 
Development with Economic, Ecologic, and Cultural Sustainability.” Water 
International. Volume 22, Number 2 (June), pp. 82-89   32
International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) 1992. The Dublin 
Statement and Report of the Conference. International Conference on Water and 
the Environment, 26-31 January 1992.  
Marshall, David 1998. Watershed management in British Columbia: The Fraser River 
Basin experience. Environments 25(2/3): 64-79 
McDonald, Adrian and David Kay (1988) Water Resources: Issues and Strategies. Essex, 
UK: Longman Scientific & Technical 
McGreer, E. and W. Belzer 1999. Contaminant sources to the Fraser River Basin. In 
Health of the Fraser River aquatic ecosystem. Colin Gray and Tainan Tuominen, 
eds. Department of Environment Fraser River Action Plan report 1998-11. 
Vancouver: Aquatic and Atmospheric Sciences Division, Environment Canada 
Mody, Jyothsna. 2001. Literature Review: Management of River Basin Systems Through 
Decentralization. Unpublished. Report prepared for the World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
SALASAN Associates Inc. 2002. Summary report: Evaluation of Fraser Basin Council 
effectiveness.  Vancouver, BC: Fraser Basin Council 
Shaw, Patrick D. and Taina Tuominen 1999. Water quality in the Fraser River Basin. In 
Health of the Fraser River aquatic ecosystem. Colin Gray and Tainan Tuominen, 
eds. Department of Environment Fraser River Action Plan report 1998-11. pgs. 
47-61. Vancouver: Aquatic and Atmospheric Sciences Division, Environment 
Canada 
World Bank 1993. Water Resources Management: A World Bank Policy Paper. 
Washington, DC.  
Wunsch, James S. (1991) “Institutional Analysis and Decentralization: Developing an 
Analytical Framework for Effective Third World Administrative Reform.” Public 
Administration and Development. Volume 11, pp. 431-451. 
 
 
   33
Appendix: Variables in the Analytical Framework 
As noted in Section 2, the analytical framework used for this research project entails 
several variables hypothesized to be related to the success or failure of river basin 
management institutions, grouped into four categories. 
 
Contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful 
decentralization is at least partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the 
time a decentralization initiative is attempted.  These initial conditions are elements of the 
social context of the decentralization effort.  They include 
 
o  Economic development of the nation; 
o  Economic development of the basin area; 
o  Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
o  Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders. 
 
Characteristics of the decentralization process 
In countries that have attempted to decentralize water resource management to the basin 
level, characteristics of the decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for 
successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are 
(a) devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of that 
authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) occur will 
depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  Important factors 
include 
 
o  Whether basin-level management was a local initiative to assume 
management responsibilities, a devolution that was mutually desired by local 
stakeholders and central government officials, or a decision by central 
government officials to shed water resource management responsibilities 
regardless of whether basin stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
o  The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin governance; 
and, 
o  Whether central government officials maintained a policy commitment to 
decentralization and basin management through transitions in central government 
administration.\ 
 
Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to condition that success.  Political and institutional variables should be   34
explored that relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-
level stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include 
o  The extent to which devolution of water management responsibilities from central 
government to basin institutions has been real or merely rhetorical, and whether 
devolution has been handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as 
an abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
o  The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the extent of their 
financial autonomy; 
o  Basin management participants’ ability to create and modify institutional 
arrangements that are tailored to their needs and circumstances; 
o  The extent of other experience at the local or regional level within the country 
with self-governance and service provision; 
o  The distribution (particularly asymmetries) of national-level political influence 
among basin stakeholders; 
o  Characteristics of the water rights system in the country which facilitate or hinder 
basin management efforts; and 
o  Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for implementation and 
adaptation of basin management activities. 
 
The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials.  Important ones include 
 
o  The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
o  The extent of clarity of institutional boundaries, and their match with basin 
boundaries; 
o  Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements recognize sub-
watershed communities of interest; 
o  The availability of forums for information sharing and communication among 
basin stakeholders; 
o  The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts whereby basin 
stakeholders can agree to contribute to improvements in basin conditions; 
o  The institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions by means that 
are trusted by water users; and 
o  The availability of forums for conflict resolution. 
 
Certainly, these factors will not all apply with equal significance in all cases.  In 
each case, the emergence and path of river basin management will be affected profoundly 
by some of these variables, affected slightly by others, and not at all by some.   
Institutional analysis in a case-study setting consists largely in determining which 
institutional factors in what combination appear to have been linked to outcomes.   
Furthermore, many of the variables listed above have subjective components, and will be 
assessed differently by different participants and observers.  It is therefore essential in 
these case studies that team members interview individuals with a variety of perspectives.   35
 
 
 